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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
\~ADA WELL~IAN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
\r. GLEN NOBLE and PERRY C. ADAMS, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATE1fENT OF FACTS 
Appellants and Defendants in th!eir staten1ent of 
facts dra \V only from those portions of the trial tran-
script that present the case in the light most favorable 
to the appellants. In doing so appellants disregard 
the Utah rule to the effect that on appeal the Supreme 
Court in surveying the evidence will revie\\'" the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the party prevailing in 
the trial court. Hillyard vs. r:tah By-Products CoJn-
pany, 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P2 287. 
On July 3, 1956, Plaintiff and her two children \vere 
riding as passengers in a Cadillac then being driven in a 
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westerly direction by her brother-in-la\Y, Harold House, 
on U. S. I-Iighway 30 in Duel County, X ebraska. lln-
rnediately ahead of the Cadillac ~Ir~. House \Yns driYing 
a Studebaker in which Plaintiff's brother \\Tas riding 
(T-4). The parties \Yere returning frorn Norfolk. Xe-
braska to their horne in Vancouver, \Vashington. That 
about 4:00 P.I\I the area through \vhich they \\Tere travel-
ling was grain country with rolling hills cr-4). ~Ir. 
House testified that as he drove over the crest of one 
of the rolling hills, he noticed that a pick-up truck to\\T-
ing a house-trailer was slowing do\vn, and it avpeared 
that the truck \\Tas stalling (T-6). The pick-up and 
house-trailer were driven to the shoulder of the road 
so that the rear of the house-trailer extended about 
three feet into the west-bound lane of the high\vay ( T -6) 
(T-298). The Studebaker slo\ved down behind the house-
trailer while it was being pulled onto the shoulder of 
the road "'\vhere it came to a stop on th·e up-grade of the 
next hill. The Studebaker then passed the house-trailer 
and pick-up (T-298) (T-6). ~Ir. House, follo\ving in 
the Cadillac, applied his brakes to slo\Y down, and \vhen 
he observed the Defendant's truck behind hirn he put 
his hand out as a signal to slow, for he \vas then unable 
to pass the house-trailer due to a car approaching frorn 
the opposite direction (~r-6) (T-~1) (T-2:2). As soon 
as the oncoming traffic cleared he started to pass the 
house-trailer and pick-up. As he \vas in the act of 
passing these vehicles, his autornobile \Yas struck in the 
rear by a large cab-over-engine truck and trailer unit 
owned by Defendant, V. Glen Xoble, and driven by 
Defendant Perry C. Adan1s (T-6). The collision oc-
curred at a point npproxirnately 500 to 600 feet \ve~t 
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of the hillcrest fro1n which the vehicles had just de-
scended, and the point of in1pact was on the up-grade of 
the next hill ( T -8). The truck unit struck the Cadillac 
'vith a heavy i1npact knocking it ahead 15 to 20 feet 
('r-117) (T-24). The truck had been following the two 
autoutobiles at a distance of about 200 feet for about 
fiYe utilL's, and the vehicles were all proceeding at a 
speeJ in the vicinity of 45 to 50 miles per hour (T-172), 
(T-190). ~lr. House testified that immediately follow-
ing the collision he got out of his automobile and walked 
back to the truck and had the following conversation 
with the Defendant, Perry C. Adams : 
~'Q. All right. You may proceed. and then 
what took place when the driver of the truck got 
out1 Did you have a conversation with him? 
A. Yes I did. 
Q. Was anyone else present at the beginning 
of that conversation~ 
A. Not at the present, at that conversation, 
no. 
Q. Will you relate, please, ~Ir. House, what 
was said by you and what was said by :\Ir. Adarns 
at that time~ 
A. I started walking back to the truck and 
he got out of it, and I asked him if he had seen 
me, and he said, 'Yes, I seen you'. And I said, 
'Why didn't you slow your truck down?' And he 
said, 'I don't know why I didn't.' 
Q. Was there any further conversation had 
between you at that time~ 
A. I don't think there \vas right at that par-
ticular time." ( T -9, 10) 
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Plaintiff was taken to Chappell, Nebraska, where 
she was hospitalized. Her attending physician had 
X-rays taken of her neck and treated her \Yith various 
medications. A cast type bandage (T-111) \Yas applied 
to her neck to immobilize her neck in order for her to 
be able to resume her trip to Vancouver, \V-ashington, 
the following day (T-112). ~Irs. \vTelln1an traveled fron1 
Chappell, Nebraska, to Vancouver lying on the hack seat 
of the automobile. 
Upon her arrival at Vancouver, she vvas hospitalized 
and remained in the hospital for 8 days, \Yhere she \\·as 
treated by a Dr. Reubendale (T-114). Follo,ving her 
release from the hospital she \vas confined to bed at 
home for a week. At the end of this ti1ne her husband 
felt she was not making satisfactory progress tovvard 
recovery and placed her under the care of Dr. J. C. 
Woodward, an orthopedic surgeon (T-115). Dr. \-Vood-
ward made a careful examination of her condition and 
ordered her to be hospitalized at the Vancouver :Jie-
morial Hospital (T-116). At the hospital she \vas placed 
in traction and given rnedication for nausea and pain. 
The nausea was so severe that it \vas necessary to feed 
her intravenously ( T -117) for the first ten days of her 
hospitalization. During the period that she re1nained 
in the hospital, she was giYen various types of therapy 
and conservative treat1nent (rr-117). ~Irs. Welhnan 
was confined in the hospital fron1 July 23rd until August 
11th, 1956. After she \Vas released frorn the hospital 
she \vas given extensive physical therapy treat1nents 
under the direction of Dr. \-rood\vard (T-57). When it 
became apparent to her physician that the physical ther-
apy treabnents \vere not achieving the desired results, 
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he changed to another for1n of treat1nent, the injection 
of a novoeain solution into the various tender areas at 
the hasP of the 8kull ( T -58, 59). The purpose of these 
injections \vas to break up the cycle and pain of the 
u1usclP spasn1 fron1 which the plaintiff \Yas suffering. 
Thi8 latter eoursP of treat1nent did not seem to accom-
plish an~· substantial ilnprovement in the plaintiff's con-
dition (T-59). 
In ~I arch of 1958, ~Irs. Wellman returned to Dr~ 
\Vood\vard, and at that time it appeared to him that 
her condition had deteriorated and was about as bad 
a~ it had been about 20 months earlier. During the pre-
ceding period of 20 Inonths she had been hospitalized, 
and she had undergone extensive physical therapy treat-
Inents in an effort by her physician to exhaust the 
various forn1s of treatment short of surgery (T-59, 60). 
In lVIarch of 1958, Dr. Woodward came to the con-
clusion that surgery was indicated, and at this time she 
underwent two separate surgical procedures which con-
sisted of the severing of Inuscles in the neck for the 
purpose of relieving co1npression on the nerves and 
artery. ~Irs. \\T ellman was hospitaliz'ed for a period 
of from 10 days to 14: days for these surgical operation~ 
and recovery period. Follo\Ying the surgery, the plain-
tiff's condition showed definite signs of improvement 
for some time (T-61, 6:2, 63), but a few months after 
these operations she again began to have pains in her 
neck and shoulders. Her condition \Va8 such that it 
was necessary for her husband and their 12-year old 
daughter to do a substantial portion of the housework 
(T-163). Dr. Woodward examined the Plaintiff in 
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1\Iarch of 1960, and at that tiine he found that the use 
of her arn1s caused cramps in both sides of the neck 
and the shoulders; that she suffered fron1 occipital head-
aches; and that there was atrophy of her n1uscles, or a 
wastingaway of the muscle tissue. The Doctor stated 
that in his opinion the atrophy was due to irritation of 
the nerve roots \Vhere the nerves caine out of the open-
ings between the vertebrae. ( T -63). 
In regard to the plaintiff'8 pern1anent disability~ 
Dr. Woodward testified as follo,vs in response to coun-
sel's questions: 
"Q. N o\v, Doctor, based upon the nun1erous 
examinations which you 1nade of _Jlrs. \Velhnan 
- - the surgical procedures that you have per-
formed and the history that you have taken fron1 
her -- do you have an opinion as to \vhether or 
not Mrs. Wellman suffers a permanent disability? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And what is that opinion, Doctor~ 
A. In my opinion l\lrs. W elhnan has suffered 
a permanent disability amounting to approxi-
mately 20 per cent as a result of this injury." 
(T-69). 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COl'RT GRANT-
ING TO THE PLAINTIFF A NE\V TRlA.L ON THE 
ISSUE (>F D..:\~LA.GES ALOXE, IX THE E\'"E~T 
THE DEFENDANrr-, F .AILED TO t i<JNSENT TO AN 
ADDITUR OF $3,000.00, \\TAS .A_ PROPER EXER-
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Cl~l~~ < >F .TlTDICIAL DISC~RETION C>N THE PART 
()F 'rH~ 1,Rl1\L COURT. 
POINT II. 
r:rHE '"rRIAL ( 1(>URT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
'rlii~~ ~~~\~IDENCJ~, BEFORE IT DID NOT JUSTIFY 
'ri-ll~ GI,"IXU OF AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT 
INS 'rRl ~ l ~ T I 0 N. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANT-
ING TO THE PLAINTIFF A NEW TRIAL ON THE 
ISSlTE OF DA:\li\_(JE,S ALONE, IN THE EVENT 
THE DEFENDANT F i\ILED TO CONSENT TO AN 
ADDITUR OF $3,000.00, WAS A PROPER EXER-
CISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION ON THE PART 
OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
Defendants contend, as the primary basis of their 
appeal, that the trial judge abused his discretion when 
he entered his Order providing for eii:her an additur 
to the judgment with the consent of both parties, or for 
a new trial on the issue of damages alone. 
The Defendants' failure to consent to the additur 
option offered hy the Court has made the question of 
additur moot as to this appeal, and, therefore, th'e only 
question before the appellate court is \Yhether or not 
the trial court abused its discretion in granting to plain-
tiff a new trial on the issue of damages only. 
The power of a trial court to grant a ne\v trial on 
the ground of excessive or inadequate damages is clearly 
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established in the provisions of R ulc 59 (a) ( 5) U.R.C.P., 
which provides: 
"' (a) Grounds. Subject to the proYisions of 
Rule 61, a new trial 1nay be granted to all or any 
of the parties and on all or part of the issues, 
for any of the following causes; * * * 
( 5) Excessive or inadequate da1nages, a p-
pearing to have been given under the influence 
of passion or prejudice." 
In the case of Paul F. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 
P2 670, the Supre1ne Court of the State of utah care-
fully spelled out the rule in regard to verdicts where 
the trial court had detern1ined that the jury had dis-
regarded the instructions of the court, or where the ver-
dict had been influenced by pa8~ion or prejudice. The 
court states as follows at page 671 of the opinion: 
''If inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict 
presents a situation that such inadequacy or ex-
cssiveness shows a disregard by the jury of the 
evidence or the instructions of the court that the 
verdict wa~ rendered under such disregard or 
misapprehension of the evidence or influence of 
passion or prejudice, then the court nzay e.rercise 
its discretiou in t h c interest of justice and grant 
a new tr£al." ( E1nphasi~ ours) 
After hearing the argu1nenb.; of counsel, and after 
examining the "\Yritten 1nen1orandu1ns submitted, the trial 
court entered the follo"\\·ing order: 
"This 1natter ca1ne before the Court on the 
plaintiff's 1notion for ne'v trial and court having 
heretofore taken the 1notion under advisement 
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at thi~ ti1ne the court being fully advised in the 
p rPnti ~es ntakes it's ruling. 
In thi~ matter it appears to the Court that 
the jury disregarded the Court's instruction per-
taining to damages and that the a\vard was in-
adequate in view of all the evidence on that issue. 
It further appears that the verdict was given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
It is ordered that the sum of $3,000.00 be 
added to the verdict and if the plaintiff and the 
defendants fail to consent to the additur within 
30 days, a new trial is ordered on the issue of 
damages only." 
'_rhe Order of the trial judge made the following 
specific findings : 
a. That the jury disregarded the court's instructions 
pertaining to damages : 
b. That the aw·ard was inadequate 1n v1ew of all 
of the evidence on that issue. 
c. That it appeared that the verdict was given under 
the influence of passion and prejudice. 
Point I of Defendant's brief charges that in making 
the foregoing Order the trial court was guilty of an 
abuse of discretion. The power of the trial court to 
exercise its discretion, and the basis upon which such 
an exercise of discretion shall be reviewed has been dis-
cussed in many recent decisions of this Court. The lead-
ing case of recent years on the subject is King 1: [] nion 
Pacific, 117 Ut. 40, 212 P2 692, 697, where the Court 
~tated: 
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"The defendant urgt~s that if a trial judge 
is allowed to set aside a verdict returned hy a 
jury which is supported by substantial competent 
evidence, there results an infringement upon its 
rights to a trial by jury. There is no rnerit in 
this contention. The Supre1ne l ~ourt of the 
United States in Capital Traction Co. D. Iiof, 
17 4 U.S. 1, 19 S. Ct. 580, 585, 43 L. Ed. 873, a1nply 
answered this argument when it said: 
'Trial by jury, in the pri1nary and usual 
sense of the term at the common la\v and in the 
American constitutions, is not 1nerely a trial hy 
a jury of 12 men before an officer vested \vith 
authority to cause them to be sum1noned and iln-
paneled, to administer oaths to them and to the 
constable in charge, and to enter judg1nent and 
issue execution on their verdict; but it is a trial 
by a jury of 12 n1en in the presence and under 
the superintendence of a judge ernpou·ered to iu-
struct them on the law and to advise them on tlze 
facts) and (except on acquittal of a criminal 
charge) to set aside their verdict) if) in his opin-
ion) it is against the la1D or the evidence.'" 
(Emphasis ours) 
An examination of the evidence before the trial 
court clearly sho·w·s that the trial court \Yas justified in 
finding that the jury disregarded the court's instruc-
tions in regard to damages and acted under passion and 
prejudice in a\varding an inadequate verdict. 
It is clear from the evidence that on July 3, 1956, 
plaintiff sustained an injury to her cervical spine at the 
ti1ne the auton1obile in \Yhich she \Yas riding \Yas struck 
hy defendant's truck \vhich had a loaded weight of 33 
tons (T-183 ). The evidence is further indisputable that 
10 
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plaintiff \va:--; hospitalized immediately after the accident; 
that hPr nPck \va:--; im1nobilized by placing it in a type of 
a cast; and that :--;he was given 1nedications in an effort 
to relieve her frorn the severe pain and nausea that 
follo\ved her initial injury. Plaintiff was forced to ride 
lying do,vn in the back seat of an automobile from 
N ehra~~ka to Vancouver, Washington, and during this 
long journe~: she suffered great pain and frequent spells 
of nausea ( T -112). 
lininediately upon her arrival in Vancouver, Wash-
ington, l\Irs. Wellman was ordered to be hospitalized 
for a period of eight days (T-113). Upon being released 
fro1n the hospital she returned to her home where she 
\Vas confined to her bed for a period of ten days. Her 
husband observed that in the days following her release 
from the hospital that instead of recovering, her condit-
ion \vas becoming more serious each day; she became so 
nauseated that she was unable to eat food or take any 
liquids \vithout vomiting (T-157). 1\Ir. Wellman's con-
cern over his \vife's deteriorating condition during this 
ten day period caused him to seek additional medical 
care for his \vife (T-158). He took his \vife to Dr. J. C. 
Woodward, an orthopedic surgeon, a diplomat of the 
A1nerican Board of Orthopedic Surgery, and a fellow 
of the Alnerican College of Surgeons ( T -158, 40). 
Dr. Wood\vard's X-Rays and initial examination of 
plaintiff indicated that sh'e needed immediate hospital-
ization, and he sent her to the Vancouver 1\Iemorial 
Hospital. Upon her arrival at the hospital she was put 
in traction, and because of her severe nausea it was 
necessary to feed her by intravenous feedings for ten 
days (T-116). 
11 
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After 1\Irs. Wellman's release fro1n this second 
period of hospitalization she was required to \vear a 
plastic cervical collar; to sleep with a traction device 
upon her neck; and to take daily diathermy treat1nents 
(T-120). Plaintiff continued these treatments over an 
extended period of time in an effort to find relief fron1 
the pain in her neck and shoulders and the headaches 
from which she was suffering (T-120, 121). 
In N ove1nber of 1957, 11r. Wellman \Yas transferred 
from Vancouver, Washington, to th'e Seattle, Washington, 
branch of his ernployer's business. After their arrival 
in the Seattle area, plaintiff's condition began to get 
worse. Her hands and arn1s beca1ne numb, and she 'vas 
not able to hold things she picked up (T-121). Her con-
dition was such that it was difficult for her to do her 
housework, and she required help from other persons 
to perform her daily household duties ( T -121). 
By lVIarch of 1958, it became apparent to Mrs. Well-
man that the deterioration of her condition, the increas-
ing pain and suffering, and the progressive loss of bodily 
function required further medical attention. She re-
turned to Vancouver to see Dr. Woodward, and he de-
termined at that tin1e that the course of conservative 
treatment that had been followed in the period sub-
sequent to her injury \vas not providing relief for her, 
and that surgical intervention \vould be necessary. There-
fore, two separate surgical procedures were performed, 
each under a general anesthetic; each procedure con-
sisted of dividing a muscle in the neck close to the point 
where it fastens to the first rib and allowing the n1uscle 
to retract upward. The purpose of this surgery \Vas to 
12 
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rPlil'Ye the ('Olnpression of the muscle upon the artery 
and nerves ( T -61). These were painful operations, and 
it \\~as neePssary that plaintiff be placed in a cast follow-
iug the surgery (T-130). This surgery was performed 
ahnost t\\·o years after the original injury and following 
a grt>at effort on plaintiff's part to obtain relief from 
hl'l' pain, suffering, and disability. 
F.,ollo\ving the surgery, ~Irs. Wellman obtained a 
certain a1nount of reli'ef, but before long she again be-
gan to suffer pains in the shoulders, ar1ns, and neck 
and to ~uffer fron1 occipital headaches, as she had so 
frequently since sustaining her injuries (T-131, 132). 
rl"he evidence indicates that she was able to perform 
onl~r a portion of her household duties. That her hus-
band and her 12 year old daughter had been required 
to do a 1najor portion of the household work. That her 
activities were restricted so that she could not enjoy 
e~unping and dancing as she had previously done. Her 
husband testified that subsequent to her injury a sub-
stantial change had taken place in her temperment and 
disposition. 'l"hat prior to her injury she was not a 
person \Yho co1nplain'ed, but that after the injury she 
was irritable and upset with her husband and children 
(T-164). Dr. Wood\vard testified that based upon the 
treatment and examination of the plaintiff during a 
period in excess of four years, that he evaluated her 
disability rating as one of approximatley 20% per-
manent disability (T-69). 
In the light of the medical evidence, of \vhich the 
foregoing is but a brief summation, and in view of the 
fact that the trial judge had the opportunity to observe 
13 
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the witnesses, both lay and uredieal, it is apparent that 
he did not abuse his discretion \vhen he found as a fact 
that the jury had disregarded his instructions pertaining 
to damages, in that an award of ~;2,000.00 general danl-
ages was so inadequate as to appear to the court to 
have been given under the influence of passion and pre-
judice. 
Appellate courts have not been un1nindful of the 
particularly advantageous position of the trial judge 
in regard to evaluating the evidence presented r.t the 
trial. Th Suprerne Court of the State of New Jersey 
discussed this sub,~ect in the case of Ruth v. Fenchel, 
117 A2 284, \vhere they stated as follo\vs at page 289 of 
the opinion: 
"We are aware of the responsibility lodged 
in a jury to resolve the factual conflict \vhich is 
invariably present in a negligence case. However; 
we are also sensitive to the emphasis placed by 
our Supreme Court in Hartpence v. Grouleff. 15 
N.J. 545, 549, 105 A 2d ( 1954), upon the superior 
position enjoyed by the trial judge over that of 
the appellate court in deciding ''vhether justire 
has been done under the particular circumstancef: 
and the weight of the credible evidence,' and this 
because 'H·e sees and hears the \vitnesses, observes 
their demeanor and reactions, none of \Yhich has 
life in the record on appeal. He is in a position 
to kno\v and equate all the factors * * *.' We 
are enjoined not to disturb th'e action of the trial 
court, 'unless it clearly and unequivocally appears 
there was a manifest denial of justice under the 
law.' The Appellate Division 1nay not substitute 
its judgment for that of the trial judge merely 
because it evaluates the evidence in a light that 
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would justify the jury verdict. Gallichio v. Gum-
ina, 35 N.J. Super. 442, 446-447, 114 A 2d 447 
(App. Div. 1955 )." 
rrhe inadequacy of the jury's award to the plaintiff 
and the disregard of the Court's instructions by th~e 
jury LPeoJne particularly apparent from the fact that 
the undisputed n1edical expenses incurred by the Plain-
tiff in the treatinent of these injuri~es amounted to 
$2,539.50. The expenses that she incurred for household 
help ainounted to $252.00. The disregard of the court's 
instruction No. 10 is further apparent by the fact that 
the jur~T failed to award plaintiff any damages as a 
result of her loss of earnings, although the evidence 
'vas clear and undisputed that at the time that she sus-
tained the injury, she was earning the sum of $10.00 
each \veek and \vould have been able to continue to earn 
such su1u from the time of her return to Vancouver. 
Washington, on July 6, 1956, up to the time that she and 
her husband and fanlily Inoved to Kent, vVashington, 
in November of 1957. Her earnings during this period 
\Vould have amounted to $680.00 (T-125, 127). The 
evidence is clear and without dispute that the total 
amount of the special damages suffered by plaintiff 
as a result of her injuries was the sum of $3,471.50, but 
despite this uncontroverted evidence of such damages, 
the jury award to plaintiff for all special damages was 
the total sum of $2,500.00. 
It is submitted that the arbitrary failure of the 
jury to award Plaintiff the total of her medical expenses, 
the expenses incurred for hous'ehold help, and the sums 
that she would have earned during this period is sub-
stantial evidence of passion and prejudice against the 
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plaintiff on the part of the jury, and it is further 
evidence of the failure on the part of the jury to fairly 
and justly consider her clain1 in the light of the court's 
instructions. Dr. Woodward testified that Plaintiff \Ya~ 
a cooperative patient, and that she follo\ved his in-
structions carefully in an effort to improve her O\\Tn con-
dition (T-99). The medical witness appearing on behalf 
of the defense indicated that in his opinion the plaintiff 
was not a n1alinger nor a neurotic ( T -273). 
The Supre1ne Court of the State of Utah discussed 
the responsibility of a trial judge in regard to his duty 
to pass on the adequacy of a jury verdict in the case of 
Badon vs. Suhrn~ann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P2 826, wehre 
the Court stated at page 830: 
''* * * It is primarily the prerogative and 
the duty of the trial court to pass upon the ade-
quacy of the verdict and to order any necessary 
modification thereof." 
In this case the Supren1e C1ourt recognized the long 
established practice of courts to exercise supervisory 
powers over the verdict \vhere the da1nages awarded 
were in excess of those shown by the evidence. The 
Court stated at page 828: 
"It has long been established that where the 
award is in excess of da1nages shown by the 
evidence it \vill not be per1nitted to stand. In 
such instances the courts exercise their inherent 
supervisory povvers over jury verdicts, which 
derive fran~ their duty to see that justice is done; 
and nu1ke correctire orders necessary for that 
purpose. This is done hy the trial court, or upon 
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its failure to do so, by this court on appeal." 
( Emphasi~ ours.) 
It i~ sub1nitted that under the powers granted the 
trial ('ourt to order a new trial on all or part of the 
i~~ues un<lPr our rules of eivil procedure, that the duty 
of the trial eourt in respect to taking action in regard 
to an ina<lPquate award of damages stands on the same 
sound legal basis as the trial court's power to act in 
regard to a situation involving an excessive award of 
damages. 
In the caS'e of Seydel v. Reuber, 94 NW2 265, the 
Supren1e Court of the State of Minnesota at page 270, 
recognized the rule adopted by the Utah Supreme ( 1ourt 
in the Badon v. Suhrmann case, supra, in the following 
language: 
HWe have fully taken into account, while con-
sidering the record in this case, that the granting 
or refusal of a new trial upon the ground of in-
adequacy of damages appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice 
is largely within the discretion of the trial court 
and that the ruling of the trial court will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless there was a clear abuse 
of discretion." 
The rule in regard to the manner in which an app'el-
late court should examine the relevant evidence in deter-
mining "'"hether there was substantial probative evidence 
to justify the ruling of the trial court is stated in the 
follo,ving language by the Supreine Court of the State 
of ~Iissouri in the case of Underwood v. Brocknu:yer, 
318 SW2 192, at page 194: 
''In determining whether there was substan-
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tial probative evidence to justi f~T the trial eourt, 
upon weighing all the evidence, to reasonaLly <on-
elude that the $1,250.00 a\Yarded as dainages \':ns 
grossly inadequate, we consider tlz e relevant C1 1i-
dence from a standpoint favoralJ!e to tlze trial 
court's ruling, u·hich in this iu.stunce, nzeau.-.,· that 
we consider the evidence franz a stand point f(u·or-
able to plaintiff." (Emphasis ours). 
Considering the evidence of Plaintiff's injury, pain 
and suffering, disability, and special da1nages fron1 a 
standpoint favorabl'e to the trial court's ruling, there is 
no reasonable basis to support defendant's contention 
that the order of the trial court on the n1otion for a ne\Y 
trial consititued an abuse of discretion on the part of 
the trial judge 
POINT II. 
THE rrRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
THE EVIDENCE BEFORE IT DID KOT JUSTIFY 
THE GIVING OF AN" lTNA \TOIDABLE ACCIDEXT 
INSTRUCTION. 
The defendants In their Point II. apparently are 
of the belief that because they plead the defense of 
unavoidable accident in the Answer, and because at the 
pre-trial they relied upon this saine defense, that they 
are thus entitled to have tbe jury instructed on the ques-
tion of unavoidable accident, regardless of the state of 
the evidence before the trial court at tbe ti1ne the in-
structions to the jury \Yere frained. 
r~rhe only evidence before the appellate court that 
when the defendant driver reached the ere8t of thP 
crucial hill that thP neare8t Yehicle ''Tas 100 feet distant 
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is the stat<'tnent to that effect contained on pages J and 
:2:2 of defendants' brief. D0fendant Adams' testimony 
in regard to the distancP \Vas as follows: 
(By 1\lr. 1\Iidgley) 
~'Q. How Inuch distaneP separated your truck 
froin the rear of the Cadillac at that tiine when 
you first obsert:ed them stopped or slowly Inov-
ing~ (Emphasis ours) (T-174) 
A. About a hundred feet I would judge." 
It is subn1itted that the fact that defendant Adams 
was about a hundred feet from the automobile in which 
plaintiff was riding \vhen he observed the Cadillac is a 
very different fact and presents a very different legal 
situation than the statement in appellant's brief on page 
22 to the effect "that when he reached the crest of the 
crucial hill the nearest vehicle was only 100 feet distant". 
The trial judge in considering the applicability of 
the unavoidable accident instruction was certainly en-
titled to consider the further testiinony of the defendant 
Adams as to \vhy he did not see the Cadillac, the Stude-
baker, and the house trailer \vhen his truck \vas at the 
crest of the "crucial hill". On cross examination de-
fendant Adam~ testified as follo\vs: 
''Q. Have you any explanation as to \vhy you 
didn't see these automobiles and this house trailer 
at the point I have indicated, or, perhaps, at 
very best \vhen your truck \vas at the point I 
have marked \vith X, rather than at the point 
you have dra\vn on the dra\ving? 
A. Well, a man is al\vays driving ahead of 
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himself, looking ahead at the traffic. And I con1e 
over the hill like I say, there was no indira tj ons 
whatsoever they were ~topped. I didn't reali.ze 
they were stopped. And as I caine over the hill 
I glanced on up the hill and back do,vn at them, 
and ahout that time I realized they \VPre stopped.'' 
{T-194-195) (Emphasis ours) 
The foregoing testimony of the defendant certainly 
justifies a finding on the part of the trial judge that the 
evidence did not support an unaYoidable accident in-
struction. This finding is further supported hy the testi-
Inony of the relief driver of the truck to the effect that 
the distance froin the bottom of the s"\\~ail to the easterly 
hill crest was 150 to 175 feet ( T -233). l\Ir. House testi-
fied that the collision occurred not at the bottom of the 
swail but beyond the bottom of the swail on the \Vesterly 
upgrade of the next hill ( T -8). This testimony is not 
disputed by either Adams or the relief driver, Whitley. 
The only conclusion that can be dra\vn fro1n the testi-
mony is that the defendant Adams had a distance in 
excess of 150 to 175 feet past the crest of the '"crucial 
hill" in which to stop. Plaintiff's 'vitness places the 
distance from the crest of the hill to the point \vhere the 
house trailer was parked at from 500 to 600 feet (T-7). 
It is clear fron1 all of the evidence that \vhile the 
distance at \vhich defendant Ada1ns clai1ns he first 
realized the Cadillac slo,ving \Vas 100 feet; the distance 
at U'hich he sau, or could ha~·e ._...,·een that the Cadillac 
was slozriug and should have taken action to ::;top his 
truck was substantially greater than 100 feet. 
The Inatter of the propriety of the trial court in-
structing the jury on the question of unavoidable acci-
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dent has occupied the attention of many appellate courts 
in recent eases. In the case of B11tigan 1:. Yellow Cab 
Conl})(lJl_tf, (('1alifornia) ~t~O 1~. ~d 500, at page 504, the 
Suprerne C~ourt of California comments on the question 
of instructing tlu~ jury on unavoidable accidents as 
follO\V~: 
·~In the modern negligence action the plaintiff 
111ust prove that the injury complained of was 
proximately cau~ed by the defendant's negligence, 
and the defendant under a general denial may 
show any circumstances which militates against 
his negligence or its causal effect. The so-called 
defense of inevitable accident is nothing more 
than a denial by the defendant of negligence, or 
a contention that his negligence, if any, was not 
the proximate cause of the injury. Scott v. Burke, 
39 Cal. 2d 388, 401, 247 P. 2d 313; Polk t~. City 
of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 2d 519, 542-543, 159 P. 2d 
931; see also Jolley v. Clemens, 28 Cal. Apv. 2d 
55, 65, 82 P. 2d 51. The staternent in the quoted 
instruction on "unavoidabl'e or inevitable acci-
dent' that these terms 'sirnply denote an accident 
that occurred without having been proximately 
caused by negligence' inforn1s the jury that the 
question of unavoidability or inevitability of an 
accident arises only where the plaintiff fails to 
sustain his burden of proving that the defend-
ant's negligence caused the accident. Since the 
ordinary instructions on negligence and proxi-
mate cause sufficiently show that the plaintiff 
must sustain his burden of proof on these issues 
in order to recover, the instruction on una~·oidable 
accident serves no useful purpose. 
It is particularly significant that no decision 
in this state, either prior or subsequent to Parker 
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v. Womack, 37 Cal. 2d 116, 230 P. 2d 823, has 
held that refusal to give the instrllcfion 1ras ·re-
versible error. In sereral cases in zrhich error 
had been claimed because of such a rc.f llsal, it 
was held that the instruction u·as .-,·uperfluous." 
(Emphasis ours) 
In the 11ontana case of Rodoni c. Hoskins, 355 P2 
296, cited in defendants' brief, the court reversed a ver-
dict for the defendant on the ground that the unavoid-
able accident instruction was erroneously given. In dis-
cussing the evidence the Court said at page 299: 
"In the instant case, it appears fro1n all of 
the testimony that an instruction concerning un-
avoidable accident \vas not appropriate. There 
was no testimony of negligence on the part of 
the driver of the Erickson vehicle, in which the 
plaintiff was a passenger. However, there \vas 
ample testimony from which negligence could be 
inferred on the part of the defendant. The de-
fendant himself testified that he \Vas familiar 
with the road and knew of the approxi1nate lo-
cation of the chuck hole and that it could 'throw 
my car if I hit it'. He knew· the streets \\~ere in 
a slippery and dangerous condition. He also 
testified that he saw the lights of the Erickson 
vehicle before going into the curve. However, 
the defendant, fron1 the testimony, apparently did 
not slow his vehicle or let the Erickson vehicle 
pass before crossing the chuck hole. [T nder t lz e se 
circunzstances 1re conclude that there u·ere no 
facts present concerning una1:oidable accident to 
.iustify the instruction and the giving of such an 
instruction b11 the trial court U'as reversible error 
as to the }Jlaintiff." (Emphasis ours) 
A rnost con1presensive analysis of the unavoidable 
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accident instruetion is found in the 1959, Kansas case of 
Krch r. 1,riuklc, ~)-t3 P2 213, \vhere at page 223 the 
Court said: 
Hln an ordinary negligence action the plain-
tiff must prove that the injury con1plained of 
\vas proxi1nately caused by the defendant's negli-
gence, and the defendant under a general denial 
nu1~~ ~hO\\. any circumstances \vhich tend to mili-
tate against his negligence or, if negligent, its 
casual effect. The 1nere fact that the defendant 
pleads in his answer the defense of unavoidable 
accident does not entitle hirn to an instruction 
on the doctrine of unavoidable accident. 
If the so-called defense of unavoidable acci-
dent is nothing more than a denial by the defend-
ant of negligence, or a contention that his negli-
gence, if any, was not the proximate cause of the 
injury, the pleading on this point is irnmaterial, 
since an instruction to the jury under these cir-
cumstances would inform the jury that the quest-
ion of unavoidability or inevitability of an acci-
dent arises only where the plaintiff fails to sus-
tain his burden of proving that the defendant's 
negligence caused the accident. The instruction 
under these circumstances "\vould serve no useful 
purpose, since the ordinary instructions on negli-
gence and proximate cause sufficiently show that 
the plaintiff must sustain his burden of proof on 
the issues of negligence in order to recover." 
VVhere the evidence before the jury is con-
fined to the issues of negligence, an instruction 
which informs the jury that the la\v recognizes 
what is terrned an 'unavoidable or inevitable 
accident' may give the jury the irnpression that 
unavoidability is an issue to be decided, and that 
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if proved, it constitutes a separate ground of non-
liability of the defendant. r-rhey 1nay then be Ini~­
led as to the proper 1nanner of determining 
liability, that is, solely on thP basis of negligence 
and proximate causation. The instruction under 
these circumstances is not only unnecessary, but 
it is confusing. 
It would therefore appear to be the better 
practice, where the evidence is confined to issue~ 
of negligence, for the trial court to eliminate any 
reference to 'lT navoidable accident' in summar-
izing the pleadings of the defendant for the jury 
in its instructions since the defendant's pleadings 
on 'unavoidable accident' have becon1e iininater-
ial." 
There was no contention that the plaintiff \Yas 
negligent in any manner in the case now before the court. 
There was not even any contention that the driver 
of the automobile in which plaintiff was riding was 
negligent. The instructions of the court fairly and fully 
presented the issues of negligence to the jury, and stated 
that the burden \Vas upon the plaintiff to prove the 
negligence of the defendant before he \\~as entitled to 
recover. 
The Utah Suprerne Court has recently commented 
on the necessity of giving an unavoidable accident in-
struction in the case of Porter r. Pr£ce, 11 Utah 2d 80, 
355 P2 66, at page 68 : 
Hit is true that In 1nost cases the usual in-
struction on negligence and proxin1ate cause 
make it sufficiently clear that the plaintiff n1ust 
sustain his burden of proof on these issues in 
order to recover, and that in such instances an 
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insfr~tcfion on IUULroidahle accident serces no 
Nscful zntr}Jose." (Emphasis ours) 
There is no eontention by the defendants that there 
\vas an~? error or inadequacy in the manner in which the 
trial court instructed the jury in regard to negligence 
and proxi1nate cause, and that the plaintiff must sustain 
his burden of proof on these issues in order to recover. 
Based on the evidence hefore the trial court and the 
instructions that were given to the jury on the foregoing 
1natters, it is evident that the trial court properly de-
terlnined that an instruction on unavoidable accident 
could serve no useful purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order of the trial court granting plaintiff a 
ne'v trial on the grounds that the jury disregarded the 
court's instructions pertaining to damages, and that an 
inadequate a'vard was given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice was amply supported by the la'v 
and the evidence. Appellate courts have constantly held 
that trial courts have broad discretion in such matters, 
and that their discretion "Till not be disturbed in the 
absence of a plain abuse thereof. No such abuse of 
discretion has been shown by the defendants. 
We respectfully submit that the Order of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
DAVID K. HOLTHER, 
and 
DAVID S. KlTNZ 
for Kunz & Kunz 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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